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Schnidman: A Trip Back in Time

A TRIP BACK IN TIME, INCLUDING JUDGE CHARLES D.
BREITEL’S RATIONALE FOR HIS FRED FRENCH AND PENN
CENTRAL DECISIONS
Frank Schnidman
Participation in The Taking Issue Conference at Touro Law
Center October 3-4, 2013 was truly a trip back in time. Forty years
ago, after serving as the Staff Director of the New York State Joint
Legislative Committee on Metropolitan and Regional Areas Study
and dealing with comprehensive revision of New York State’s planning legislation, I was in Washington, D.C. as a consultant to the
Council of State Governments, the National Legislative Conference
and the National Governor’s Conference. While in Washington, I
followed, analyzed, and reported on the activities surrounding the
Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act (S.B. 268) that was
under discussion by the 93rd United States Congress, and the subsequent proposals that were introduced in the 94th Congress. Such responsibilities brought me into contact with the President’s Council on
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), the Conservation Foundation
(“CF”), the Urban Land Institute (“ULI”), as well as many state and
Note from the author: In order to get a better understanding of the critical issues forty years
ago, see Congressional Research Service, “Readings on Land Use Policy: A Selection of Recent Articles and Studies on Land Use Policy Issues and Activities in the United States”
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975) 642 pages. And, when another
popular report from the era was released, the 318-page “The Use of Land: A Citizen’s Policy
Guide to Urban Growth,” the article in the New York Times on Sunday, May 20, 1973 read:
“Authority Over Land Use Is Termed a Public Right.”

Frank Schnidman, Senior Fellow, School of Urban and Regional Planning, Florida Atlantic
University, Boca Raton, Florida; B.S. Springfield College; J.D. Albany Law School; LL.M.
in Environmental Law, George Washington University. Member of the Florida, New York,
California and District of Columbia Bars. Schnidman is a keen observer of the planning and
legal environment, and his thoughts on what was evolving in the 1970s can be reviewed in
Frank Schnidman, The Courts Enter the Zoning Game: Will Local Governments Win or
Lose?, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 590, 590-611 (1975), where he comments, “Ultimately, the
failure of the state legislatures and Congress to provide for land use planning which meets
aesthetic, environmental, economic, and legal needs of the people of the United States may
make the courts major participants in the zoning game.”
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local organizations. In addition, since the legislation was actually a
planning grant program to the states, I continued to closely follow the
activities of a number of states, including Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, Florida, New York and Vermont. It was during this
time that I researched and wrote the small paperback book, A Legislator’s Guide to Land Management,1 which the Council of State Governments distributed to more than 7,600 state elected officials and
their staffs.
I had the honor and privilege of working with so many truly
dedicated professionals, including Fred Bosselman. It was Fred
Bosselman that introduced me to Richard Babcock, and in 1977 I began a decade of co-chairing the American Law Institute-American
Bar Association (“ALI-ABA”) Land Use Litigation continuing legal
education course of study with Richard Babcock. In 1985, after
Richard Babcock retired, I combined this program with Fred’s Land
Planning and Regulation of Development course and Gideon Kanner’s Eminent Domain course, co-chairing with Fred and Gideon the
new Land Use Institute course. Fred stayed on as co-chair until he
left active practice and began teaching law at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1991. Gideon and I still co-chair the Land Use Institute course, and we have been individually or jointly chairing ALIABA courses for more than thirty-seven years.
I mention the ALI-ABA courses because that was not only a
common project that I had with Fred each year, but it was also the
opportunity to keep my fingers on the pulse of what was happening in
land use planning and litigation across the United States. And, it was
in 1979 that I convinced recently retired New York State Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Charles David Breitel to serve as the Keynote
Speaker at the 1979 Land Use Litigation program in Philadelphia. At
the time, Judge Breitel, who retired in 1978, was a member of the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s (“LILP”) Transfer of Development
Rights Study Group, a group that I had organized for LILP Executive
Director Arlo Woolery. Judge Breitel served more as an observer of
the group rather than a participant, and I was, therefore, pleased that
he agreed to speak at the Land Use Litigation course.
His remarks, “Land Affected with a Public Interest,”2 appear
in this volume because they are truly significant in assisting Taking
1

FRANK SCHNIDMAN, A LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE TO LAND MANAGEMENT (1974).
Judge Breitel presented the Keynote Address at the ALI-ABA Land Use Litigation
course of study in Philadelphia, PA, on October 12, 1979.
2
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Issue historians better understand the thinking that went into the New
York Court of Appeals’ Fred French3 and Penn Central4 decisions.
Forty years ago, Fred’s The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
Control5 and his The Taking Issue6 volumes were cutting edge in educating a generation of land use professionals who are now quickly
passing from the active scene. It had only been a few years since the
first Earth Day, a few years since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, a few years since the United States landed men
on the moon! Congress was debating national land use legislation,
the environmental movement was in its infancy, the states were experimenting with taking back some of the regulatory authority delegated to local government under adaptations of the U.S. Department
of Commerce’s Standard Zoning Enabling Act,7 and the United
States Supreme Court had not yet returned to examining Taking Issue
land use cases.
So, step back in time. Try to remember the legal scene in the
mid-1970s, or imagine it based upon what you learned in law or
planning school. Clear your mind of decades of state, federal and
Supreme Court cases on the Taking Issue. Relax and focus on the
words of Judge Charles D. Breitel. First, read his brief biography to
better understand the man, and then read his words. He was a
thoughtful man, an observer of politics and the legal system, and a
prophet when it came to the presentation he gave in 1979 in Philadelphia to a group of land use attorneys seeking to better understand the
evolving nature of the Taking Issue.

3

Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
5
FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
6
FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DAVID L. CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL
(1973).
7
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH
MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. ed. 1926).
4
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“LAND AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST”*
Honorable Charles D. Breitel
Mr. Schnidman has indicated in his introduction that my main
thesis is not so much the “how” – as a matter of fact, it would be folly
for me to address a group of this kind on the “how.” You all know
much more about it than I do. And yet, there is a value in hearing
from somebody, I think, who has been the subject of how lawyers
have exercised the “how” and to what extent it has been satisfactory,
and to what extent it may have not been satisfactory.
My thesis, if I have one, could be described, first, that all land
and its improvements are affected with the public interest. This is a
drastic statement to make, and I alone am responsible for it. By that,
I mean that all land and the improvements on them have ceased to be
recognizable by the simple concepts that we used in another time.
Now, you have heard that before – that the simple concepts no longer
apply. I am extrapolating that principle to a much broader base. On
the other hand, I could also offer it as a thesis – and this is a tough
one – that litigation in land use today is because of the changes that
have occurred and the principles that are involved as being much
more than a litigator applying rules of legal precedents and supplying
the basic economic facts and other facts of the case that lawyers are
always presenting – I would say that a litigator in the land use field
has to be a “statesman.”
The reason for this is the whole change in our society – it is
*

These remarks were presented by Judge Breitel as the Keynote Address at the ALI-ABA
Land Use Litigation Course of Study in Philadelphia, PA, on October 12, 1979.

Charles David Breitel (1908-1991) was a graduate of the University of Michigan and of
Columbia University School of Law. He was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York
in 1933. He served on the staff of Thomas E. Dewey, first in the New York City Special
Prosecutor of Rackets Office, and then in the District Attorney of New York County Office.
He also briefly was in private practice with Dewey. When Dewey became Governor in
1943, Breitel became Counsel to the Governor and served until 1950 when he was appointed
to fill a vacancy in the New York Supreme Court. He served for two years and then was
elected to the Appellate Division, First Department where he served between 1952 and 1966,
moving to the Court of Appeals as an Associate Judge from 1967 to 1972, when he became
Chief Judge, a position he held until mandatory retirement in 1978 at the age of 80. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson appointed Judge Breitel to federal judicial commissions. He was active in numerous legal associations, including serving as the Vice President
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He served as Chairman of the Twentieth Century Fund’s Task Force on the Future of New York City. He was also the author of
numerous law review articles.
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not just in land use. Let me give you a better illustration. In the field
of public corporations, and by that I mean corporations that are
owned by public people – I do not mean governmental corporations –
the idea of corporate governance being responsible for social and
economic effects in the whole society is a marked change. We are no
longer surprised that the Securities Exchange Commission and that
other persons argue, urge or require that there be public members on
boards of directors. The corporations no longer can justify their existence by the fact that they produce profits for their stockholders –
they have a social responsibility.
Let me give you another illustration that comes a little bit
closer to a natural resource like land. Many years ago, in the 19th
century, the New York Legislature adopted a statute that granted, just
like a deed, to the Niagara Falls Power Company in perpetuity the
right to use the flowing waters of the Niagara River, Niagara Falls,
that now produces so much power. The right to use the flowing waters in perpetuity was for very small rental. It was done exactly as if
the State had the power to grant a fee absolute in the flowing waters
to the Niagara Falls Power Company. By the middle of this century,
the courts held a state never had the power to grant any kind of title
to the flowing waters of a navigable stream. The flowing waters belong to the people and were not susceptible of passage of title any
more than the atmosphere might be.
I do not say that land has reached that point, but it begins to
give you an idea that we approach land with that kind of interest, and
so that the old concepts of private property in regard to land not only
have already changed, but the change in the future will be greater.
Now, why has this been so? It has been because we have recognized that no man in society, no asset in society, is capable of the
kind of capture that goes back to old common law thinking. No kind
of capture so that you can completely occupy it and make it your own
the way you might the food that you eat and eventually digest. And
because of that, we recognize that there is an interaction and an interdependence that everything that society permits us to have . . . and
incidentally, on the horizon, we have problems of world assets and
you now hear voices talking about the oil resources in other parts of
the world of maybe being world assets and not something that the
particular countries happen to lay upon these subsurface resources
have a title interest in the same nature that they may have title to other things.
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Now, why do I say all these things and why do I think it is
important that lawyers recognize it. In the first place, let me give you
an elementary principle as I see it about advocacy. Ultimately, the
lawyer performs its function by assisting the court in deciding the
case before it justly. It sounds a little bit twisted, does it not? My duty as a lawyer says the lawyer is to represent my client’s case and win
it the best I know how. Of course, that is true. But how does he succeed in that unless he also can persuade the court that what his clients
seeks is the just result that the court would or should apply. Now,
courts do not always know everything. In fact, I have heard that it is
most often that they do not and therefore, the lawyers’ function is to
supply that additional education that will provide the court with the
basis for making that just decision.
We cannot do that in the land use field unless we recognize
the scope of the changes that have occurred. Now a trite statement is
that zoning, originally which was our first regulatory land controls
after common law nuisance principles, was simply designed to permit
people to develop the kinds of neighborhoods and communities that
they wish to have within certain reasonable grounds. That is so long
as there is lots of land, lots of possible places for communities, lots of
places for people to go and find homes. And then think of where we
come today to cases like Mount Laurel,8 the issues raised by Belle
Terre,9 the problem even suggested in Berenson v. Town of Newcastle10 where we must be concerned with regional developments. The
relationship of all of this to the demographic problems of exclusion
of the poor or the not so poor but no so rich, or of races or other ethnic groups where we go well beyond the particular community, well
beyond the concept of zoning simply designed to produce good
communities, and, of course, even commercial and industrial zoning,
are all part of the same thing.
So that now we are talking in terms of regional concerns so
that a community by itself cannot establish standards just to make itself almost as if it were an enclave, a parochial area begot. The concern has to be devoted to other problems that exist in the society, and
that is not the end of it. I mentioned already a matter of economic
and racial exclusion. Then, we have landmarking – the sites, the
buildings – this has nothing to do with the earlier concepts that we
8
9
10

336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/12

6

Schnidman: A Trip Back in Time

2014]

A TRIP BACK IN TIME

427

have applied. Historic districts and, then of course, we have very serious environmental concerns from wetlands to nuclear sites. The latter can be analogized to nuisance by a very great stretch.
Now what is the result of all of this? The result of all of this
is that the so-called “rights in private property” are seriously limited.
And yet, lawyers to this day will argue in cases in which these questions come up. What I have referred to before in opinions I have
written is what was really a matter addressed by Mr. Justice Holmes
in the Pennsylvania Coal11 case, that a regulation when severe
enough amounts to a taking.12 Think of that as it applied to the fields
I now refer to.
On the other hand, we have already said, and the lawyers on
the other side will always point to it, that under the police power you
can impose whatever regulations are required for the public welfare,
provided they are reasonable and the owner of the property has some
way of getting a reasonable return. And that is perfectly obvious, I
would think, that neither of these principles will satisfy the kinds of
concerns we have in cases today or the cases that we will have in the
future. Even this morning’s discussion, for example, about the First
Amendment issues with adult entertainment, begin to suggest a part
of that problem. And I will not try to be a third voice in a very good
discussion we had this morning. But, there is a larger public concern
beyond that just of those that would be exploiters in that field and the
interest of the community, the particular community if you like, in
having one kind of an environment as compared with another.
Now, what I have said was also illustrated by Mr. Schnidman
in his introduction when he said I would not talk about the cases in
which I wrote the decision, and I do not intend to, but two of them
had a very pointed exposure in this respect, and they are the Fred
French13 case and the Penn Central14 case. In Fred French, the City
of New York by ordinance, and then into zoning ordinance, had decided that the private park at the Tudor City apartment complex
should forever remain open to the public, and that the owners had the
obligation of maintaining the park and keeping it open to the public,
and for this they offered no compensation.15 This would look very
11
12
13
14
15

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 415.
Fred F. French Investing Co., 350 N.E.2d 381.
Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d 1271.
Fred F. French Investing Co., 350 N.E.2d at 382-83, 386.
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easily like meeting the proposition that if it is excessive regulation
then it amounts to a taking, and that is exactly what the owners argued because they would have loved to gotten the money for the value of the park in the 42nd Street district on the eastside. And so, they
were claiming inverse condemnation.16
By the way, I said they were offered no compensation, but
they were offered something. They were offered transferable development rights that could be used anywhere in Manhattan, in the Midtown area where they could find a likely site. 17 The Court of Appeals
struck it down and said that this amounted not to a taking.18 On the
other hand, it was an illegal exercise of dominion over a private
property and the exchange offered was inadequate and too speculative.19
Now, in the Penn Central case, there is your public interest
against your private interest, and the Penn Central case deals with a
landmark; transferable development rights were also offered and a restriction on any change substantially in the use of the Grand Central
Station which still is capable of a return, but nothing like the exploitable value if they could put a huge high rise office building in its
place, preserving a part of the facade and so on.20 There, the transferable development rights were allocable to other properties owned
by the railroad.21 They owned much of the Park Avenue and 42nd
Street area, where they could use them.
Incidentally, this part of the case was never addressed by the
Supreme Court of the United States. When the case came up that was
sustained on the ground that this would approximate some of the loss
of economic benefit that the owners would have if they were free to
exploit the land they own. On the other hand, we said very daringly
that the owner was not entitled to receive the kind of value attributable to any other normally improved land because Grand Central Station, and the railroad associated with it for over 100 years, had been
the beneficiary of all sorts of public and social benefits. 22 The Supreme Court unfortunately never commented upon that to tell us
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 382.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Penn. Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1273.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1274.
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whether we were wrong or whether we were right. Maybe they were
“scaredy cats,” I do not know. But you see, there again, there was
this tip of balance between a public right against a private right, not
satisfied by talking in terms of police power, not satisfied by terms of
excessive regulation, because obviously in both cases the amount of
intrusion over the rights of the owner was markedly greater – therefore, was “excessive” as compared with anything that we have tolerated by way of regulation before, which came under the terms of zoning in the community interests, sanitation, building codes and the
like. So that you could see that there has to be that movement. Now
the Supreme Court, for example, in the Penn Central case, sustained
it on the ground that it was an exercise of the police power.23
We have other, much more troublesome scenarios. Think of
wetlands and other environmental concerns where the restrictions under a rubric of police power and public welfare go so far as to virtually deprive the owner of all use of his land, except the privilege of
paying taxes. So it means that there is another principle up already,
that there is a change just the same as we had changes in these other
areas.
Now what does it mean to the lawyer? It means for the lawyer, that when you have these problems, that you come to the court
not only with the development of facts as we normally categorize
facts, but almost with what used to be called a “Brandeis Brief”; a
development of all the economic, political, demographic, sociological
and First Amendment, Second Amendment, Third Amendment – all
of the primary Constitutional rights of the first Ten Amendments,
with the parts to capitulate some of the fundamentals of American
society. And unless you proffer that kind of background, you leave
the court without the help you can give it that may be better for your
clients and otherwise. I can tell you that in both the Fred French
case and the Penn Central case there was little help from the lawyers
from that point of view. Oh, they did a marvelous job in the traditional sense of arguing about excessive regulation, the right to compensation and the exercise of police power, why it was important to
keep Tudor City Park as a park and it was, all the buildings were rising higher and higher all around there.
By the way, our sustaining of the transferable development
rights in the Penn Central case, actually in the final proof was justi23

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
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fied, although the Court did not know whether it would be or not.
The railroad sold development rights for the old airlines terminal
building across the street from Grand Central to the Philip Morris
Company that was putting up a high rise, for $2.5 million.24 But you
see, these are the things that the lawyer must do to help us judges—I
still say us, though I am an ex—in the handling of these very difficult
problems.
But if you think that the changes we have had are relatively
small ones, maybe big to you, but I mean small as compared to what I
have said, mistake it not – it is a change in our whole attitude, our
kind of “society.”
I have another peculiar figure of speech. I once owned a
house of my own in a suburb of a city and I was very much as absolute an owner as anybody can be in American society in the 20th
Century. And I no longer own it. I now own a cooperative apartment
in an apartment house. You know how much that is like owning a
private home?
I tell you all of us have become cooperative owners in our society. And that is the whole difference, and that is why I come back
to the point of my beginning – that to be a good land use lawyer you
have to be statesman.
Thank you very much.

24
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, GRAND CENTRAL SUBDISTRICT 11
(1991), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/history_project/grand_central_subd
istrict.pdf.
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